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THE ELUSIVE MONITORING FUNCTION
OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS+
S. Burcu Avci,* Cindy A. Schipani** and H. Nejat Seyhun***
American corporate law has long relied on independent directors as a
panacea to many challenging issues of corporate governance.1 One of the
most important functions of independent board members is monitoring a
company’s top management to effectively protect shareholder interests.2
Generally, boards consist of independent directors as well as insiders,
including the CEO who typically serves as the Chairman. Often, there are
existing professional or social ties between the management and independent
directors.3 But, the extent to which these relationships might impair a
director’s judgment is difficult to assess.4 Therefore, regulatory efforts tend
to focus on the number of independent directors and their direct ties to the
company.5 What is not obvious is whether lack of an explicit tie to
management is sufficient for the independent directors to act in the best
interest of the shareholders instead of their own best interests.
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1. See Adam C. Pritchard, Monitoring of Corporate Groups by Independent Directors,
9 J. KOREAN L. 1, 1-3 (2009) (explaining that greater director independence has been a long-
term trend in American corporate law).
2. See Nicole F. Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1435, 1444-45 (2011) (describing that outside directors with no material ties to the
corporation can objectively make decisions to maximize shareholder wealth and not be
influenced by management).
3. Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 270 (1997).
4. Id. at 280-81.
5. See Sharpe, supra note 2, at 1436 (explaining that there are several regulatory
examples, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that are aimed to increase director independence).
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Testing whether independent directors protect shareholder interests
against self-interests of members of top management is a difficult task, in
part, because the individual voting records of directors are private. We
circumvent this difficulty by focusing on the purchases and sales of stock by
all insiders (instead of their votes), including the independent directors, in
their own firms and comparing these patterns to each other. We also focus
on firms involved in class action lawsuits to refine our tests.
This Article seeks to examine these issues by empirically measuring the
effectiveness of independent directors on company boards. Specifically, we
test two mutually exclusive hypotheses: (1) independent directors act in
favor of shareholders rather than in their self-interest, and (2) independent
directors have been co-opted by management. We test these hypotheses by
examining the number and profitability of insider trades by top executives
and independent directors. We also compare insider trades in firms that have
settled class action litigation with insider trades in firms that were not
involved in class action litigation.
We analyze trades in firms involved in securities class action lawsuits
that have resulted in large settlements because these events represent periods
when the conflict of interest between top management and the shareholders
is especially acute. In effect, class-action litigation means that top
management is alleged to have engaged in fraud to enhance their own narrow
self-interest at the expense of their shareholders. That top management has
agreed to pay large sums to settle these cases also means it is likely plaintiffs
could have won these cases upon trial. Thus, the settlement requirement
reduces the likelihood of frivolous cases. Consequently, class periods in
settlement cases represent times when shareholders are in special need of
protection from decisions of top management. Therefore, it is important to
know if independent directors live up to their monitoring responsibility when
they matter most.
If independent directors are effective at monitoring other executives,
then we would expect they would not be heavy sellers of company stock
during the class action period. If, however, independent directors are co-
opted by management, we would expect their behaviors, with respect to
selling their shares of company stock, to coincide with the behavior of other
members of top management. That is, we would expect that they would trade
(sell) as heavily as the other insiders during the class action period and make
similar abnormal trading profits as other top executives.
As analyzed in Part III, the evidence indicates that independent
directors, along with management, trade (or sell) intensely and earn large
abnormal profits on material non-public information during the class period,
supporting the hypothesis that they have been co-opted by management.
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Thus, a corporate governance system that in theory relies on the capability
of independent directors to effectively monitor management behavior is
seriously flawed in practice. Our evidence indicates that simply requiring a
certain number of independent directors has not resulted in an effective
system of monitoring, but rather, has created the illusion of it.
To address these issues, this Article is organized as follows. Part I
begins with a discussion of the development of the monitoring role of
corporate boards and addresses the myriad of contexts in which the law relies
on the independence of outside directors to monitor management. Part II
then examines empirical studies that have attempted to discern the
effectiveness of independent board members in corporate governance. Parts
III and IV describe and analyze our empirical study and implications for
improving corporate governance. Our recommendations and concluding
remarks follow.
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I. THE MONITORING ROLE OF CORPORATE BOARDS
Up until the 1970s, company boards were dominantly comprised of
company executives.6 Inside directors are uniformly defined as directors
who are currently employed by the corporation.7 Two events, however,
triggered reform and called for the inclusion of independent board
members—corporate scandals and academic publications.8 With the rise of
6. Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate Governance, 40
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 32 (2015).
7. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 133
(2010).
8. Harald Baum, The Rise of the Independent Director: A Historical and Comparative
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the shareholder primacy model,9 academic research examined managerial
behavior, ownership structure, and agency costs, with a focus on the costs of
dereliction in managerial behavior on shareholder value.10 As a result, these
studies seem to suggest that managers should be monitored to maximize
shareholder wealth.11 Insiders have been presumed to be biased and lacking
in objectivity with respect to decisions made by other managers and, thus,
cannot be trusted.12 In contrast, at least in theory, independent directors
should be capable of impartially assessing the actions and decisions of the
company, making them even better suited to monitor the organization than
external regulators.13 In addition, the introduction of calls for corporations
to examine their social responsibilities in the 1970s conceptualized the
corporate board as an independent and objective decision-making
authority.14 To protect shareholder value, more independent board members
were needed on company boards.15
The 1978 Corporate Director’s Guidebook was the first advisory
attempt to distinguish between outsiders and insiders on the board.16 In
addition, in 1994 the American Law Institute published its highly influential
Principles of Corporate Governance, recommending rules for the
composition of the boards.17 The trend for increasing the number of
independent members on the board of directors gradually grew in the ensuing
Perspective (Max Planck Inst. for Comparative and Int’l Private Law, Working Paper No.
16/20, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2814978 [https://perma.cc/XMT7-EU84].
9. Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return
of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1169, 1177 (2013).
10. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306 (1976) (examining
such topics as agency, social responsibility, and separation of control and ownership); see
also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 321-23 (1983) (examining separation of risk-bearing and decision-making); see
generally, Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of
Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 839 (1993) (describing the role of the market for
corporate control in affecting efficient exit).
11. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 309-10 (noting that most of the
literature in this area focuses on how “to provide appropriate incentives for the agent [defined
broadly] to make choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare given that uncertainty
and imperfect monitoring exist.”).
12. Fairfax, supra note 7, at 139.
13. Id. at 141.
14. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1518-19
(2007).
15. Id. at 1519.
16. See generally American Bar Association, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 33 BUS.
L. 1591 (1978) (discussing the roles of inside and outside directors in a corporation).
17. Baum, supra note 8, at 14.
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decades—the ratio of independent directors on company boards increased
“from approximately 20% in the 1950s to approximately 75% by the mid-
2000s.”18 As of 2017, independent members comprised up to 84% of all
board members, with the CEO serving as the only insider on the boards of
most S&P 500 companies.19
The primary purpose of having outsiders on company boards is to
monitor the CEO and other insiders in the C-suite.20 Shareholders want to
minimize executive perquisites to maximize firm value.21 The beliefs that
outsiders are well-equipped to monitor insiders and that independent
supervision is the best way to increase the company’s performance became
so strong in past decades that researchers have called for increasing the
number of outsiders on the board.22 For example, Lipton and Lorsch
recommend at least two-thirds of the membership of the board include
independent directors.23
Massive takeover activities in the 1980s emphasized the importance of
independent directors in the context of evaluating the business judgment of
the board.24 This trend continued through the 1990s with markets
concentrating on executive rights and compensation.25 Corporate financial
responsibility scandals in the 2000s, and the collapse of giants such as Enron
and WorldCom, stimulated Congress to act against corporate fraud. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)26 mandates complete audit committee
independence.27 In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank
Act28 requires independent compensation committee members.29
In Delaware, the concept of independence is not statutorily defined.
Instead, courts have judicially developed the doctrine and emphasized the
role of independent directors in addressing many corporate governance
18. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1471.
19. Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director
Independence Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 45–46 (2017).
20. Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 789
(2011).
21. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 241
(2007).
22. Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate
Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59, 67-68 (1992).
23. Id.
24. Baum, supra note 8, at 14.
25. Id. at 15.
26. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (West 2010).
27. Id. § 301.
28. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5301
(West 2010).
29. Id. § 952.
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challenges. The next section examines these contexts.
A. Self-Dealing Transactions
In the self-dealing context, to receive the protection of the business
judgment rule (BJR), a director must be, among other qualifications,
disinterested and independent.30 The BJR provides a presumption that the
director acted in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation.31
Where the BJR applies, courts do not second-guess business decisions of
directors in the absence of gross negligence, conflict of interest, or
intentional misconduct.32 The Delaware Legislature provides further
protection for transactions where a director or officer has a conflict of interest
in section 144(a)(1) of the Delaware Code.33 According to this statute, a
transaction between a corporation and an interested director or officer is void
or voidable, unless the interest is disclosed to the board or a committee of
the board, and the transaction is authorized in good faith by a majority of the
disinterested directors on the board or the committee.34 Thus, in a conflicted
transaction, a director often seeks ratification by majority of independent
directors to receive the BJR protection. According to the court in Cooke v.
Oolie, under section 144(a)(1),35 the BJR applies to the “actions of an
interested director, who is not the majority shareholder, if the interested
director fully discloses his interest and a majority of the disinterested
directors ratify the interested transaction.”36 Thus, ratification by
disinterested directors resolves the conflict in the director’s favor.
Judicial deference to ratification by independent directors is explained
further in Cooke, where the court emphasized, “the disinterested directors’
ratification cleanses the taint of interest because the disinterested directors
have no incentive to act disloyally and should only be concerned with
advancing the interests of the corporation.”37 The court thus presumes “that
the vote of a disinterested director signals that [participation in] the interested
transaction furthers the best interests of the corporation despite the interest
30. Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV.A. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 24,
2000).
31. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
32. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(1)(a) (West 2010).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 144.
36. Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 24,
2000).
37. Id.
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of one or more directors.”38 Moreover, according to Cooke, the disinterested
directors’ vote in favor of the proposal supported the assertion that the
conflicted directors acted in good faith and in the interests of the corporation
and its shareholders.39 Thus, if the deal was detrimental to other
shareholders, the independent directors would not have voted in favor of it.40
Previously, in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court
also held that one director’s interest in a challenged transaction is not
sufficient, without more, to deprive a board of the protection of the BJR
presumption when the transaction was ratified by independent directors.41
B. Controlling Shareholder Transactions
Independent board member ratification plays an important role in the
context of transactions instituted by controlling shareholders. In Rosenblatt
v. Getty Oil, the court pointed out that an independent bargaining structure
is powerful evidence of the fairness of a merger transaction.42 The case-by-
case judicial review of this type of transaction focuses on factual evidence
of whether the special committee appointed to evaluate the transaction was
truly independent, fully informed, and had the freedom to negotiate at arm’s
length.43 Under Delaware law, the BJR, as opposed to entire fairness, is the
standard of review that governs going-private mergers “between a
controlling stockholder and its corporate subsidiary, where the merger is
conditioned ab initio upon both the approval of an independent, adequately-
empowered Special Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and the
uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.”44
Likewise, in In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. Shareholder
Litigation,45 the court also expressly declined to extend the entire fairness
review to a case involving an interested cash-out merger and the protection
of minority shareholders.46 According to the court, the BJR would be the
applicable standard of review “if the transaction were (1) recommended by
a disinterested and independent special committee, and (2) approved by
stockholders in a non-waivable vote of the majority of all the minority
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 634 A.2d 345, 363–64 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
42. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 938 (Del. 1985).
43. Id. at 938-39.
44. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).
45. Civil Action No. 758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009).
46. See id. at *2 (explaining, however, that the procedures used in this case were not
sufficient to invoke business judgment review).
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stockholders.”47 The M & F Worldwide Corp. court also listed approval by
an independent special committee as one of the prerequisites for applying
the BJR to decisions involving controlling shareholder buyouts.48
C. Special Litigation Committees
The issue of independence of corporate directors has attracted much of
the Delaware courts’ attention in the context of special litigation committees
(SLCs) appointed to evaluate whether shareholder derivative suits should
proceed. The Delaware courts have recognized the effectiveness of
derivative suits as an intra-corporate means of policing boards of directors.49
Derivative suits involve a claim of wrongdoing with a resultant injury to the
corporation, as opposed an injury to the suing shareholder. Thus, the injury
is indirect as to the plaintiff, and the compensation for the harm is paid to the
company.
To bring a derivative action, among other standing prerequisites, the
plaintiff must first demand that the board of directors pursue the cause of
action on behalf of the company, unless demand is futile.50 To demonstrate
the futility of the demand, the court must affirmatively answer the questions
of “(1) whether threshold presumptions of director disinterest or
independence are rebutted by well-pleaded facts; and, if not, (2) whether the
complaint pleads particularized facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt
that the challenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment.”51 When lack of independence is charged, “a plaintiff must show
that the Board is either dominated by an officer or director who is the
proponent of the challenged transaction or that the Board is so under his
influence that its discretion is ‘sterilize[d].’”52
The court affirmatively answered in Zapata v. Maldando53 the question
of whether the board, after tainted by the self-interest of most of its members,
47. Id. at *12.
48. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).
49. 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(3). Plaintiff must state with particularity: “(A) any effort by the
plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority and, if
necessary, from the shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the action
or not making the effort.” Id.
51. Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205 (Del. 1991), overruled on procedural grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (The reasoning behind the pleading rule, as noted
in Levine v. Smith, is to strike a balance between the right to assert such a claim and the board
of directors’ duty to decide whether they should invest the resources of the company to defend
against the claim).
52. Id.
53. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 779 (Del. 1981).
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could legally delegate the authority to determine if a derivative suit should
proceed to a SLC that consists of two disinterested directors.54 The court
further pointed out that, “at le[a]st by analogy to our statutory section on
interested directors, . . . it seems clear that the Delaware statute is designed
to permit disinterested directors to act for the board.”55 The SLC, therefore,
may move to dismiss derivative litigation that is believed to be detrimental
to the corporation, on the corporation’s behalf.56
In addition, the SLC in Zapata was formed four years after the litigation
started and demand had been excused.57 In this context, the court noted that
“we must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow directors
in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this instance, who designated
them to serve both as directors and committee members.”58 The question, as
the court noted, naturally arises, “whether a ‘there but for the grace of God
go I’ empathy might not play a role.59 And the further question arises
whether inquiry as to independence, good faith and reasonable investigation
is sufficient safeguard against abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse.”60
The Zapata court negatively answered the latter question in the context
of the case, and thus created a two-step test to be applied in ruling on a
motion to dismiss a derivative suit based on the judgment of the SLC. First,
a court must look into the independence, as well as the good faith, of the
committee, and a court should inquire into the bases that support the
committee’s conclusions with the burden of proof on corporation.61 Second,
it is important to balance legitimate claims addressed in a derivative
stockholder suit with the corporation’s best interests in pursuing those
claims, as judged by an independent investigating committee.62 Zapata then
held the court should determine, in the court’s own business judgment,
whether the motion should be granted.63 Thus, the independence of the SLC
is a critical factor for determining whether a court will support a motion of
the SLC to dismiss a derivative suit.
54. Id. at 786.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 788.
62. Id. at 789.
63. Id. at 788-89.
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D. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Though the need for independent board members and auditors gained
importance after the Enron scandal,64 independence was already an important
issue in sensitive industries.65 An example is the investment company
industry.66 In 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
imposed an at-least-forty-percent independence requirement on boards of
directors of investment companies because boards play a critical role in the
operation of funds and protecting the interests of shareholders.67 Later, with
the rash of financial scandals, independence became even a more important
issue.68
After the Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Adelphia scandals,
as well as many other company failures at the beginning of 2000s, the SEC
and members of the U.S. Congress began to address auditing and corporate
governance principles.69 The major outcome of this process was SOX, which
codified certain standards for corporate executives, boards of directors, and
audit committees.70 Section 301 of SOX regulates audit committee
independence and requires all committee members to be independent
directors.71 Moreover, under SOX, the board of directors may not hire
company managers for consulting services.72
64. See The Lessons from Enron, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2002), https://www.economist.co
m/node/976011/print [https://perma.cc/4FL8-TLZJ] (“Companies need stronger non-
executive directors, paid enough to devote proper attention to the job; genuinely independent
audit and remuneration committees; more powerful internal auditors; and a separation of the
jobs of chairman and chief executive”).
65. Interpretive Matters Concerning Indep. Directors of Inv. Companies, Investment
Company Act Release No. IC – 24083, 70 S.E.C. Docket 2017, 1999 WL 820629, at *2 (Oct.
14, 1999).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7-
8 (2006) (ebook).
69. ROBERT R. MOELLER, COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: ESTABLISHING
EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE, RISK, AND COMPLIANCE (2d ed. 2011) (ebook).
70. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002s, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (West 2010).
71. Id. § 78j-1.
72. MOELLER, supra note 69. SOX requires audit committees to be comprised solely of
independent board members, stating “[e]ach member of the audit committee of the issuer shall
be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent.” 15
U.S.C. § 78j-1. To be independent, “a member of an audit committee of an issuer may not,
other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors,
or any other board committee—(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee
from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.” Id. §
78j-1(m)(3)(B)(i)-(ii).
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Federal securities laws did not directly address issues of corporate
governance before SOX was enacted, especially regarding issues of board
structure, size, and independence of directors.73 SOX was controversial, in
part, because corporate governance had been primarily the province of state
law.74 Furthermore, courts were reluctant to dictate a board structure.75 The
importance of independent members’ participation, especially in the merger
context, began to arise even before the enactment of SOX, however.76
Commentators have thus suggested that because there is a well-functioning
market for directors, direct regulation, such as SOX, might be unnecessary
and counter-productive.77
The legislative history of SOX shows that Mr. Oxley, a member of the
Committee on Financial Services, had a number of concerns with the bill.78
Mr. Oxley’s Report from the Committee on Financial Services (the Report)
provides a section-by-section analysis of the bill. Section 15 requires the
SEC to review governance practices and directs the SEC, among other
things, to determine “whether the rules, standards and practices relating to
determining whether independent directors are in fact independent are
adequate.”79 According to Mr. Oxley, the bill lacked “provisions to ensure
that independent directors are truly independent.”80 Explaining further, he
stated that the bill should have eliminated the practice of compensating
73. See James S. Linck et al., The Determinants of Board Structure, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 308,
310 (2008) (“Prior to SOX, the securities laws did not directly address board composition,
board size, and director qualifications.”).
74. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1527 (2005) (“In contrast to provisions in SOX entirely
within the bounds of traditional securities regulation, . . . the substantive corporate
governance provisions overstep the traditional division between federal and state jurisdiction,
although they did not have to do so.”).
75. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534, 548 (1984) (“Board structure, however, is not a matter that has
been, or . . . can be dictated by judicial decisions . . . . Thus, the board structure sections fall
squarely into the grey area . . . .”).
76. See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 1205 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 273 (1997)
(“This is most apparent in the merger context, in which the courts have required active
participation by the board and have held independent directors accountable . . . . Particularly
when independent directors serve on special committees, courts appear to take for granted
active participation extending well beyond the monitoring function.”).
77. See, e.g., David Yermack, Board Members and Company Value, 20 FIN. MARKETS &
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 33, 33 (2006) (“[T]his evidence suggests that a well-functioning market
for directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-
productive.”).
78. H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 44-45 (2002).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 49.
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independent directors as “consultants” while they are members of the
board.81 In addition, the Report notes that the former Chief Accountant of
the SEC, Lynn Turner, and others, consider pay to directors as consultants
as “back-door compensation that fundamentally undermines their
independence.”82 Significant consulting compensation may disincentivize
an otherwise independent director from challenging the same management
that is paying for their consulting services.83 Thus, a provision prohibiting
directors from providing consulting services would help ensure that directors
act in the best interests of shareholders, devoid of conflicts of interest.84 But
the amendment, prohibiting independent directors from serving as
consultants, did not pass. The vote was twenty yeas and thirty-eight nays.85
In addition, Mr. Oxley advocated for shareholder approval of
compensation in the form of stock option plans.86 But according to SEC
Chairman Pitt, stock options fail to align the interests of management with
those of shareholder. Pitt proposed specific measures to fix the stock option
arrangements87 requiring, in addition to shareholder approval, a committee
of independent directors to make the decisions granting options to senior
management.88
Other testimony included that of Mr. Philip Livingston, President and
CEO of Financial Executives International, advocating that companies be
required to provide a report of key corporate governance practices. Further,
he said that the current best practice was to have a governance and
nominating committee composed of independent directors.89
Jerry J. Jasinowski, President of the National Association of
Manufacturers, argued that the audit committee should be composed of
members who are well-informed on matters of corporate accounting and
finance as well as experienced in management of corporate affairs.90 He
further contended the audit committee needs to work closely with
management and the outside auditors, yet maintain necessary independence
81. Id.
82. Id. at 50.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 28.
86. Id. at 53.
87. Id. at 52.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 371 (statement of Philip Livingston, President & CEO, Financial Executives
International).
90. Id. at 392 (statement of Jerry J. Jasinowski, President, National Association of
Manufacturers).
248 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 21:2
in order to sufficiently operate in its supervisory review function.91 He
concluded the independence of outside auditors and audit committees must
be preserved in “the quest for providing complete and accurate information
about the enterprise’s operational and financial status.”92
In his testimony before the Financial Services Committee, Mr. Damon
Silvers, Associate General Counsel at the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations, pointed out corporate governance
begins with the board,93 and companies need directors who are both strong
and independent.94 He explained part of the problem at Enron was Enron
“touted directors as independent who really had significant ties to Enron
management, ties that Enron did not have to disclose.”95 Therefore, boards
should disclose all ties between board members, the company, and company
management to investors.96 Also, in agreement with these sentiments, Mr.
Silvers further testified corporate governance is in need of more effective
boards and audit committees.97 For example, requiring independence of a
number of board members and further requiring finance and financial
reporting skills on the audit committee should lead to more effective
monitoring of management.98
Joseph V. Del Raso, a partner at Pepper Hamilton LLP, expressed
concern about over-regulating boards of directors. Del Roso’s testimony
emphasized the majority of boards take their responsibilities very seriously,99
especially in the post-Enron and post-Global Crossing world, and
independent directors “have become increasingly aggressive in acting as
watchdogs over their respective shareholders interests.”100 He then
concluded any additional regulation may “further dampen the enthusiasm of
qualified people to serve as independent directors.”101 Thus, he expressed
concern that further initiatives, including personal liability expenses “except
in the most egregious cases of willful, wanton misconduct and onerous
regulatory sanctions,” are likely to discourage these individuals from serving
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 494 (statement of Mr. Damon Silvers, Associate General Counsel, American
Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 495-97.
98. Id.
99. The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparence Act:
Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the H. Comm. of Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 102 (2002) (statement
of Joseph V. Del Raso, Partner, Pepper Hamilton LLP).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 362.
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as independent directors.102
E. Stock Exchanges
In 1998, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) sponsored a Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees
(the Committee).103 The Committee issued a report with ten
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of audit committees.104 The
NYSE, NASD, and other exchanges revised their listing standards to comply
with these recommendations.105 In 2002, however, in light of high profile
corporate failures, the NYSE and NASD filed further corporate governance
reform proposals. In addition, pursuant to SOX, the SEC promulgated Rule
10A-3 under the Exchange Act.106 This rule requires audit committees of
public companies to be independent, together with other substantive rules
regulating the operation of the committees.107 New NYSE and NASD and
other exchange listing requirements were formed based on the rule.
After SOX imposed independence requirements on audit committees,
the NYSE and NASDAQ put more emphasis on regulation of director
independence. New market listing standards required more independence
than the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act)108 or SOX.
The NYSE mandates the boards of listed companies be comprised of a
majority of independent board members109 and further mandates the audit
and compensation committees consist only of independent directors.110 To
be independent, the director must not have a material relationship with the
102. Id. (“They are keenly aware of the realities of shareholder litigation, the parameters
surrounding appropriate indemnities, and the finite limits of directors’ and officers’ liability
coverage if the corporate indemnity is insufficient.”).
103. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt,
Concerned that the Quality of Corp. Fin. Reporting Is Eroding, Announces Action Plan to
Remedy Problem (Sept. 28, 1998), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/pressarchive/1998/98-9
5.txt [https://perma.cc/W8ND-2JKB]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Pitts
Seeks Review of Corp. Governance, Conduct Codes (Feb. 13, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/n
ews/press/2002-23.txt [https://perma.cc/NU5Z-2Q8M].
104. Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit
Committees, Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness Of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1067 (1999).
105. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Audit Comm. Disclosure, Release No. 42266 (Dec.
22, 1999).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (West 2018).
107. Id.
108. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (West 2010).
109. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.01 (2009).
110. Id.
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company directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization
that has a relationship with the company.111 The determination of whether a
particular relationship qualifies as “material” is left to the board to decide,
leaving a significant gray zone in the definition.112 The determinations are
also left uncontested by the stock exchanges and the SEC, leading to the lack
of proactive enforcement of their requirements.113
In addition, the NYSE manual provides a non-exhaustive list of relevant
factors for determining independence of members of the compensation
committee, evaluating that director’s ability to be independent from
management.114 The NASDAQ Listing Manual utilizes a similar
framework.115 It follows that, according to SOX and the exchange rules,
independence is tied to the outsider status, as someone who lacks certain ties
to those in control of the corporation.116
Interestingly, in M & F Worldwide Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court
stated that satisfaction of the NYSE standards of independence may serve as
an illustrative and informative factor for the Delaware Court, although such
satisfaction is not conclusive.117 The Sandys v. Pincus court also found that
a determination under the NASDAQ rules that a director is independent is
relevant under Delaware law.118 Professor Langevoort, however, argues that
111. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 (2013).
112. Nili, supra note 19, at 40.
113. Id.
114. Id. These factors include the source of compensation, whether such director is
affiliated with the listed company, or its employee (or has been within the last three years,) or
an immediate family member is an executive officer of the listed company. In addition, if the
director has received, or has an immediate family member who has received, during any
twelve-month period within the last three years, more than $120,000 in direct compensation
from the listed company, other than director and committee fees and pension or other forms
of deferred compensation for prior service (provided such compensation is not contingent in
any way on continued service), then such member is not independent. Id. at 51-52, 51 n.91.
115. NASDAQ Listed Company Manual § IM-5605 (2013).
116. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 450
(2008) (stating that “The hallmark of the independent director, so conceived, is an absence of
ties to those in control of the corporation”).
117. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 649 n.26 (Del. 2014). The Court
stated that: “[t]he record does not support the Appellants’ contention that that [sic] the Court
of Chancery “relied heavily” on New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) rules in assessing the
independence of the Special Committee, and that the application of such rules “goes against
longstanding Delaware precedent.” The Court of Chancery explicitly acknowledged that
directors’ compliance with NYSE independence standards “does not mean that they are
necessarily independent under [Delaware] law in particular circumstances.” The record
reflects that the Court of Chancery discussed NYSE standards on director independence for
illustrative purposes.
118. Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 132–33 (Del. 2016). The court reasoned that “[t]he
bottom line under the NASDAQ rules is that a director is not independent if she has a
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a lack of financial or material connections to management must be
supplemented with “a willingness to bring a high degree of rigor and
skeptical objectivity to the evaluation of company management and its plans
and proposals”119 to be independent.
F. Challenges to the Independence of the Board Committee Members
In determining whether a member of a SLC is independent, the
Delaware courts tend to consider whether the alleged conflict of interest
would likely impair the impartiality of the member’s decision-making,
taking into account the situational context. For example, in M & F
Worldwide Corp., the plaintiffs challenged the independence of the members
of the SLC selected to evaluate a merger.120 Regarding the first committee
member challenged, the court concluded that although the member had
engaged in business dealings with a conflicted director nine years earlier,
this relationship did not undermine his ability to evaluate the merger
impartially.121 Another member of the special committee received $200,000
in legal fees as the head of a law firm from the defendant company and
another company in which the defendant owned a 37.6% stake.122 The court
held the $200,000 compensation was not material to the member of the
special committee, finding it unlikely “that it would have influenced his
decision-making with respect to the M & F proposal.”123 The member was
also a law professor at Georgetown. The plaintiff further alleged possible
influence from the committee member’s position at Georgetown Law
because a conflicted and influential director was on the Georgetown Board
‘relationship which, in the opinion of the Company’s board of directors, would interfere with
the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.’ The
NASDAQ rules’ focus on whether directors can act independently of the company or its
managers has important relevance to whether they are independent for purposes of Delaware
law. Our law is based on the sensible intuition that deference ought to be given to the business
judgment of directors whose interests are aligned with those of the company’s stockholders.
Precisely because of that deference, if our law is to have integrity, Delaware must be cautious
about according deference to directors unable to act with objectivity. To consider directors
independent on a Rule 23.1 motion generates understandable skepticism in a high-salience
context where that determination can short-circuit a merits determination of a fiduciary duty
claim.” Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting NASDAQ Marketplace Rule 5605(a)(2)).
119. Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 798
(2001).
120. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d, at 647.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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of Visitors.124 But because the SLC member was tenured before he met the
conflicted director, the court rejected the argument that the Georgetown
connection would influence his independent decision-making.
In addition, the SLC member was also invited a few months after
approval of the merger to join the board of directors of Revlon, Inc., a
company at which one of the defendants served on the board. This fact also
did not raise a triable issue, according to the court, because there was no
evidence that the committee member expected to be asked to join Revlon’s
board at the time he served on the SLC.125 Lastly, evidence of business
relationships with another member of the board and significant stockholder
of the defendant company prior to the SLC member joining the board had no
bearing because there was no evidence that the committee member “had an
ongoing economic relationship [with the board member] . . . that was
material to her in any way.”126
According to the M & F Worldwide Corp. court:
[t]o show that a director is not independent, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the director is “beholden” to the controlling party
. . . . Bare allegations that directors are friendly with, travel in the
same social circles as, or have past business relationships with the
proponent of a transaction or the person they are investigating are
not enough to rebut the presumption of independence.127
In addition, a plaintiff who is attempting to demonstrate that a director
was not independent must meet a materiality standard—ties must be
sufficiently substantial that a member’s ability to objectively discharge his
or her fiduciary duties would be impaired.128 The court also held the presence
of some financial ties between the interested party and the director, with
nothing more of concern, is not sufficient to disqualify a director.129 “The
inquiry must be whether, applying a subjective standard, those ties were
material, in the sense that the alleged ties could have affected the impartiality
of the individual director.”130
Another court, however, found the compensation at issue disqualifying
in In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.131 This
court questioned the independence of the special committee member because
124. Id.
125. Id. at 647-48.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 648–49.
128. Id. at 649.
129. Id. at 649-50.
130. Id.
131. No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *33 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
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of his prior significant consultant fees, received from the defendant
company.132 In contrast, in Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp.,
the Delaware Supreme Court held an independent director, who was elected
by and represented one of the company’s largest shareholders, was
nonetheless a disinterested director.133 The shareholder owned
approximately 11.5% shares of the company.134
The court went further in tightening requirements of the independence
of SLC members in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation.135 The issue
in Oracle involved whether to grant the motion to dismiss the derivative suit
based on the recommendation of the SLC. The court noted the question of
independence “turns on whether a director is, for any substantial reason,
incapable of making a decision with only the best interests of the corporation
in mind,” ultimately focusing on impartiality and objectivity.136
The two Oracle SLC members, were professors at Stanford
University.137 The defendant directors also had significant ties to Stanford.
One of the defendants was “another Stanford professor, who had taught one
of the SLC members when the SLC member was a Ph.D. candidate and who
serve[d] as a senior fellow and a steering committee member alongside that
SLC member at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
‘SIEPER’.”138 Another was a Stanford alumnus who directed major
donations to Stanford and “serve[d] as Chair of SIEPR’s Advisory Board.”139
The third defendant was the CEO of Oracle who also directed and
contemplated further major donations to Stanford.140
The court noted that the self-interest of a director may flow from
“personal or other relationships,” in addition to a financial stake.141 As the
132. Id. The court noted that: “[b]efore 1996, the percentage of total fees represented by
work [the director] performed for [the defendant] was always greater than fifty percent. From
1987 through 1998, [the defendant company and its affiliates] were the largest single client
of [the defendant’s] firm. In 1998, [the member] became ‘of counsel’ at his firm and was put
on a retainer arrangement wherein [the defendant’s company] paid compensation of $25,000
per month to [the member], and $5,000 per month to his firm, to cover [the member’s] office
rental cost. That amount represented all of [the member’s] compensation for 1998.”
133. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 65 (Del. 1989).
134. Id. at 56.
135. 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) rev’d in part on other grounds, 817 A.2d 149 (Del.
2002).
136. Id. at 920 (quoting Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211,
1232 (Del. Ch. 2001)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 920–21.
141. Id. at 938–39 (quoting Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 24 (Del. Ch. 2002)).
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court acknowledged:
It is, I daresay, easier to say no to a friend, relative, colleague, or
boss who seeks assent for an act (e.g., a transaction) that has not
yet occurred than it would be to cause a corporation to sue that
person . . . . Denying a fellow director the ability to proceed on a
matter important to him may not be easy, but it must, as a general
matter, be less difficult than finding that there is reason to believe
that the fellow director has committed serious wrongdoing and that
a derivative suit should proceed against him.142
The court considered the independence of the members of the SLC
based on the facts known about them specifically, applying a so-called
“subjective ‘actual person’ standard.”143 The court then allowed the
derivative action to proceed.144 The connections to Stanford were enough to
create concerns regarding the impartiality of the SLC.145
In re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation146 is another case where
plaintiffs successfully challenged the objectivity and impartiality of the
independent directors participating on the SLC. The shareholders sued the
directors for violation of their fiduciary duty because they usurped the
opportunity from eBay of participating in the initial public offerings.147 eBay
had hired Goldman Sachs to underwrite its initial public offering (IPO).
eBay’s board of directors consisted of seven members,148 including three
defendant-directors and one former director who had all received IPO
allocations from Goldman.149
The court concluded that directors who received IPO allocations were
obviously interested in the transactions.150 The other four directors of eBay
142. Id. at 940.
143. Id. at 942.
144. Id. at 948.
145. Id. at 942. In this inquiry: “a court must often apply to the known facts about a specific
director a consideration of how a reasonable person similarly situated to that director would
behave, given the limited ability of a judge to look into a particular director’s heart and mind.
This is especially so when a special litigation committee chooses, as was the case here, to
eschew any live witness testimony, a decision that is, of course, sensible lest special litigation
committee termination motions turn into trials nearly as burdensome as the derivative suit the
committee seeks to end. But with that sensible choice came an acceptance of the court’s need
to infer that the special litigation committee members are persons of typical professional
sensibilities.” Id. at 940 (quoting Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1167
(Del. 1995)).
146. No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2004).
147. Id. at *1-2.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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did not participate in the “spinning” and served on the SLC formed to
determine whether the case against the defendant directors should proceed.151
The plaintiffs alleged that the non-participating directors all had “close
business and personal ties with the individual defendants” and could not
exercise necessary independent judgment in order to determine whether
eBay should bring a breach of fiduciary duty action against the individual
defendants.152
The court noted that defendant directors (and their affiliates) owned
about one-half of eBay’s outstanding common stock, and thus they had the
ability to control eBay and to direct business and affairs, including electing
directors and approving significant corporate transactions.153 The SLC
members were awarded stock options with the alleged value potentially
running into the millions of dollars.154 Many of the options awarded to the
independent directors had not yet vested at the moment of transaction
approval.155 Thus, the court held that one could not conclude realistically
that the SLC members “would be able to objectively and impartially consider
a demand to bring litigation against those to whom [they were] beholden for
[their] current position and future position on eBay’s board.”156
Courts have also found that certain business and social relationships
adversely affect the impartiality of independent directors. For example,
shareholders successfully showed that a board member could not act
independently of the company’s chairman where the board member “had a
close friendship of over half a century with the interested party [and] the
director’s primary employment (and that of his brother) was as an executive
of a company over which the interested party had substantial influence.”157
Deep friendship ties have also been found to impact the determination
of independence. In Sandys v. Pincus, a director and her husband co-owned
a private airplane along with the board chairman, who was also the
controlling stockholder and interested in the transaction at issue.158
According to the court, it created reasonable doubt about the director’s
independence because “plane ownership was not common and involved
partnership in [an] expensive personal asset that required close cooperation
in use, which was suggestive of detailed planning indicative of continuing,
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *3.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Del. Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017, 1019 (Del. 2015).
158. Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 128-30 (Del. 2016).
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close personal friendship.”159
II. EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE -
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Scholars have been attempting to empirically discern the effect of
independent boards on corporate governance issues. This Part provides a
summary of some key findings within corporate governance literature.
A. Board Composition and Firm Performance
Empirical evidence on the relation between independent directors and
firm performance is mixed. There is a significant body of literature finding
a positive relation between shareholder wealth or firm performance and
boards with outside independent directors.160 Two studies focused solely on
tender offers.161 These studies found a positive relation between independent
159. Id. at 124.
160. See Michael H. Schellenger et al., Board of Director Composition, Shareholder
Wealth, and Dividend Policy, 15 J. MGMT. 457, 465 (1989) (finding “a direct relationship
between outside directors’ representation on the board and corporate financial performance”);
see also Scott W. Barnhart et al., Firm Performance and Board Composition: Some New
Evidence, 15 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 329, 338 (1994) (concluding that their study
potentially indicates a relationship between firm performance and board composition); Sanjai
Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257,
271-272 (2008) (stating that “if the purpose of board independence is to discipline
management of poorly performing firms, then board independence has merit” but cautions
against relying on independence to improve performance); Audra L. Boone et al., The
Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis, 85 J. FIN.
ECON. 66, 90-91 (2007) (finding a positive relationship between board independence and
constraints on managerial influence); John W. Byrd & Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside
Directors Monitor Managers?, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 220 (1992) (finding evidence that
shareholders benefit when managers and independent directors hold a fraction of the bidding
firm’s common stock); James F. Cotter et al., Do Independent Directors Enhance Target
Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 216 (1997) (concluding
that independent directors, among other things, enhance shareholder wealth); Anzhela
Knyazeva et al., The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence, 26 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1561, 1597 (2013) (“[W]e find that board independence has significant positive effects
on firm value . . . .”); Rick Molz, Managerial Domination of Boards of Directors and
Financial Performance, 16 J. BUS. RES. 235, 246 (1988) (noting that their study weakens
arguments that a manager-dominated board increases a firm’s financial performance); Stuart
Rosenstein & Jeffrey G. Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder
Wealth, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 175, 190 (1990) (providing evidence that independent directors may
increase the value of firms).
161. Byrd & Hickman, supra note 160; Cotter et al., supra note 160.
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members and returns to shareholders during tender offers.162 On the other
hand, other scholars could not find any relationship between number of
independent members on company boards and performance.163 Benjamin E.
Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, for example, claim that even if their
results are due to a measurement error, the relationship between these two
variables, if any, is weak at best.164 Additionally, Nikos Vafeas, could not
find a relationship between board composition and earnings-return
relation.165
Some studies find that director independence is conditionally effective.
One study found that if the cost of acquiring information is low, the addition
of independent directors enhances financial performance. 166 Yet, a high cost
of information acquisition causes independent directors to worsen financial
performance. The same relationships were suggested to exist between
earnings management and board independence.167 Monitoring quality was
also found to improve if a majority of independent directors serve on
multiple monitoring committees in a company.168 In addition, firms with
independent directors who serve on multiple monitoring committees were
found to exhibit more sensitivity to CEO compensation, CEO turnover, and
earnings management.169
Audra L. Boone and colleagues find a positive relation between the
firms’ board independence and the firms’ growth and diversification, while
at the same time, a negative relation between board independence and CEO
162. Id.
163. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition
and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, 20 FIN. MGMT. 101, 111 (1991); see also Stephen
P. Ferris & Xuemin (Sterling) Yan, Do Independent Directors and Chairmen Matter? The
Role of Boards of Directors in Mutual Fund Governance, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 392, 417 (2007)
(finding board independence as rather insignificant in its effects on the quality of governance);
Richard H. Fosberg, Outside Directors and Managerial Monitoring, 20 AKRON BUS. & ECON.
REV. 24, 32 (1989) (finding essentially no relationship between managerial performance and
the number of outsiders on the board).
164. Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 163, at 111.
165. Nikos Vafeas, Board Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings, 19 J. ACCT. &
PUB. POL’Y 139, 157-58 (2000).
166. Ran Duchin et al., When are Outside Directors Effective?, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 212-
13 (2010).
167. See Xia Chen et al., Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings
Management? Evidence from Recent Regulatory Reforms, 20 REV. ACCT. STUD. 899, 926
(2015) (finding that “the reduction in [discretionary accruals], as explained by the change in
board independence and information acquisition cost, is associated with better firm
performance”).
168. Olubunmi Faleye et al., The Costs of Intense Board Monitoring, 101 J. FIN. ECON.
160, 169-70 (2011).
169. Id. at 170.
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influence on board decisions.170 Eliezer M. Fich and Anil Shivdasani find
that the busyness of independent directors is associated with weak
governance.171 Busy independent directors are also likely to quit boards after
poor performance.172 Weisbach finds that independent directors are
positively associated with resignations of CEOs after bad performance.173
B. Board Composition and Monitoring
Some authors suggest that there are significant trade-offs between board
composition and monitoring. Independent directors provide advice and
counsel to executives, while at the same time they monitor them.174 As
independent directors monitor more, executives tend to reveal less
information to them.175 These studies thus suggest that management-friendly
boards can be optimal depending on various conditions.176 Another study
attempted to address optimal board size and board composition and found
that these depend on the characteristics of the firm and the particular
directors.177 Furthermore, transparency is another important issue in
corporate governance. Research shows that transparency has a positive
relation with the percentage of independent directors.178
C. Board Composition and CEO Role
A positive relationship has also been found between separation of the
CEO position from that of the chair of board and subsequent operating
performance.179 The drafters of the Commonsense Corporate Governance
Principles (the Principles) argue that a board’s independent directors should
analyze and decide whether the roles of chairman and CEO should be
170. Boone et al., supra note 160, at 69, 87.
171. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?, 61 J. FIN.
689, 691 (2006).
172. Id. at 711-12.
173. Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431,
457-59 (1988).
174. Adams & Ferreira, supra note 21, at 218.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 219.
177. Charu G. Raheja, Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of
Corporate Boards, 40 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 283, 283-85 (2005).
178. See Christopher S. Armstrong et al., Do Independent Directors Cause Improvements
in Firm Transparency?, 113 J. FIN. ECON. 383, 402 (2014) (“We present results that are
generally consistent with the interpretation than an exogenous (required) increase in the
proportion of independent directors results in an increase in corporate transparency.”).
179. Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 160, at 257.
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separate or combined.180 If the board chooses a combined role, the Principles
point out that a strong lead independent director with clearly defined
authorities and responsibilities is vital for the board.181 In addition, the
Principles encourage boards to explain the choice to shareholders.182
Studies have also found a negative relation between CEO compensation
and the level of control from board of directors.183 Similarly, equity
ownership of board members has a negative relationship with CEO
compensation.184 Equity ownership of board members was found to be even
more important than percentage of independent directors on the board in
affecting CEO pay.185 Steven Kaplan found that CEOs are indeed monitored
by boards: CEO pay levels were not significantly higher than other top-
income groups in 2012 compared to the levels in the early 1990s, and CEOs
were rewarded for high performance and penalized for low performance.186
Anil Shivdesani and David Yermack studied the CEO’s role in selecting
directors.187 They found that a CEO on the nominating committee results in
fewer independent outside directors, and more gray outsiders (those who
have conflict of interests) on company boards.188 They claim that CEOs
reduce the pressure of active monitoring by using this mechanism.189
Responding to similar criticism, the NYSE manual mandates complete
independence of members of the nominating/governance committee of listed
companies.190 Nonetheless, CEOs are still heavily involved in appointments
of new directors.191
180. Common Sense Principles of Corporate Governance, GOVERNANCEPRINCPLES.ORG, h
ttp://www.governanceprinciples.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/GovernancePrinciples_Principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD64-5JG
U] (last visited June 19, 2018).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Brian K. Boyd, Board Control and CEO Compensation, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 335,
340-41 (1994).
184. Id. at 340.
185. Richard M. Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management
Compensation: Theory and Evidence, 48 MGMT. SCI. 453, 453 (2002).
186. Steven N. Kaplan, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the US:
Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, NBER REP., no. 3, 2012, at 1, 3.
187. Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board
Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1830 (1999).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1852.
190. NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.04(a) (2013) “Listed companies must
have a nominating/corporate governance committee composed entirely of independent
directors.”
191. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Independence of Directors in Delaware Corporate
Law, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 73, 92-95 (2016) (discussing the relationship dynamics
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D. Connections between the CEO and Board Members
Academics are generally in agreement about the relationship between
connectedness of CEO with directors as well as other top executives and
corporate fraud.192 Vikramaditya Khanna finds that connectedness through
past employment, education, and social organizations significantly affects
the incidence of corporate fraud.193 N. K. Chidambaran and colleagues argue
that nonprofessional connections, such as alma mater, increase the likelihood
of fraud while professional connections from employment overlaps lower
the probability of fraud.194 In addition, these authors argue that independence
is only a necessary, but not a sufficient element to stop corporate crime.195
Randall Morck introduced social psychology theories to the analysis and
claims that related literature indeed lacks evidence of the relationship
between board independence and corporate performance, potentially due to
hidden deep personal ties between independent directors and CEOs.196
Jeffrey Coles and colleagues introduce the term “co-option” to redefine
independence of boards.197 Co-option is the fraction of the board comprised
of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office, making them likelier to
side with the CEO.198 The authors argue that co-option reduces the board’s
monitoring, negatively impacts the connection between CEO turnover and
firm performance, but increases CEO pay and investments.199 Based on the
data, they conclude that co-opted independent directors are not associated
with the effective monitoring.200
between directors and CEOs who appoint them as directors).
192. See Vikramaditya Khanna et al., CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud, 70 J.
FIN. 1203, 1204-05 (2015) (finding that allowing CEOs to appoint many other executives
reduces checks and balances on the executive suite); see also Cesare Fracassi & Geoffrey
Tate, External Networking and Internal Firm Governance, 67 J. FIN. 153, 187-88 (2012)
(stating that appointing directors with external ties to the CEO may undermine governance
effectiveness); N. K. Chidambaran et al., CEO-Director Connections and Corporate Fraud
Not Just Whether You Are Connected But How 31 (Fordham Univ. Sch. of Bus. Research,
Working Paper No. 2010-009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1681472 [https://perma.cc/3RJE-H
R9P] (finding a reduction in fraud where past professional relationships exist between the
CEO and board members).
193. Khanna, supra note 192, at 1242.
194. Chidambaran, supra note 192 at 1.
195. Id.
196. Randall Morck, Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance-Independent
Directors and Non-Executive Chairs 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
10644, 2007).
197. Jeffrey L. Coles, et al., Co-Opted Boards, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 1751, 1752 (2014).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1753.
200. Id. at 1754.
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A positive relationship has been also found between stock ownership of
independent board members and the probability of disciplinary actions
toward management in the case of poor performance.201 These findings
suggest that stock ownership provides additional incentives for the board
members to monitor management actions.
E. Insider Trading
Enrichetta Ravina and Paola Sapienza analyze insider trading of
independent directors and other executives.202 Their results show that there
is very little difference between the insider trading profits of independent
directors and executives; the profits for both groups are also higher in
companies with weaker corporate governance.203 Another study analyzes
insider trading of independent directors who serve on multiple boards.204
Douglas C. Cook and Haubing Wang find that audit and compensation
committee memberships increase trading performance.205 Moreover, multi-
firm directors outperform single-firm directors in their insider trading
profitability.206
F. Earnings Fraud
A number of studies have found that firms are less likely to commit
earnings management tactics or financial statement fraud if they have boards
or audit committees with independent directors.207 On the other hand,
Stephen P. Ferris’ and Xuemin Yan’s study leads to the opposite conclusion,
201. Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 160 at 257.
202. Enrichetta Ravina & Paola Sapienza, What do Independent Directors Know?
Evidence from Their Trading, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 962, 963-64 (2010).
203. Id.
204. Douglas C. Cook & Huabing Wang, The Informativeness and Ability of Independent
Multi-Firm Directors, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 108, 108-09 (2011).
205. Id. at 120-21.
206. Id.
207. See Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:
An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEM. ACC. RES. 1, 3
(1996) (finding that firms without an audit committee or with board members closely
connected to management are more likely to commit fraud); see also Anup Agrawal & Sahiba
Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 48 J. LAW & ECON. 371, 374
(2005) (stating that companies with boards or audit committees that have an independent
director who is a financial expert are less likely to restate earnings); Mark S. Beasley, An
Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial
Statement Fraud, 71 ACC. REV. 443, 463 (1996) (showing that boards with a higher
percentage of independent directors are less likely to commit financial fraud).
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claiming no significant relationship between board independence and
financial statement fraud.208 Another study found that family affiliations
may also play a role in the likelihood of financial fraud—firms with CEOs
from the founding family are more likely to restate financial statements.209
III. OUR EMPIRICAL STUDY
As described above, independent directors have been relied upon to
monitor management and to thus maximize shareholder wealth.210 Where
there is a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders,
independent directors are thought to be able to prohibit managers from acting
in their self-interest.211
Some studies find a positive relationship between directors’
compensation and directors’ monitoring of the executives.212 Yet other
studies reveal that independent directors are not as efficient as in protecting
shareholder wealth as projected.213
We test two mutually exclusive hypotheses to measure the effectiveness
of independent directors on company boards. The first hypothesis is that
independent directors act in favor of shareholders. That is, they act in the
corporate interest and do not seek to personally profit when doing so. The
second hypothesis is that directors, when presented with certain
circumstances and have the same opportunities as executives to act in their
self-interest, behave the same as the executives.
If the first hypothesis is true, then independent directors act good faith,
and including them on corporate boards creates value for shareholders.
However, if instead the second hypothesis is true, then reliance of
independent directors as effective corporate monitors should be questioned.
We test these hypotheses by examining the insider trading by top
executives, independent directors and all officers excluding outsiders in the
presence of a class-action lawsuit that resulted in a settlement. We also
compare securities class actions (SCAs) of firms that settled class action
claims with the firms that were not involved in SCAs. If independent
208. Ferris & Yan, supra note 163, at 393.
209. Agrawal & Chadha, supra note 207, at 371.
210. Alces, supra note 20, at 789.
211. Id.
212. Shin Rong Shiah Hou & Chin Wei Cheng, Outside Director Experience,
Compensation, and Performance, 38 MANAGERIAL FIN. 914, 932 (2012).
213. See Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 163, at 111 (discovering no apparent
connection between firm performance and board composition); see also Ferris & Yan, supra
note 163, at 393 (finding no connection between director independence and reduction in
fraud).
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directors are good monitors of executive behavior, we would expect
independent directors to refrain from trading company stock during the class
action period. If the second hypothesis is correct, we would expect
independent directors to behave similarly to insiders and sell company stock
during the class action period.
A. Data
This study analyzes the insider trading activities of top executives,
officers, dependent directors, and independent directors of the companies
listed in the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse
(SCAC).214 SCAC keeps track of more than 4000 class action lawsuits filed
in Federal Court since the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.215
An SCA is a claim filed on behalf of a group of shareholders. The
complaint contains allegations that the company or its managers violated at
least one federal or state securities law, but most are brought under federal
law.216 Commonality of interest is required to certify a class and plaintiffs
must demonstrate that the claims of the representatives of the class are
typical of every class member.217
The analysis period of the study is 1996–2016, our data set contains
4041 filed cases. Law firms often file a class action lawsuit if any large
214. Stanford Law School, About Us, SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://securities.stanford.edu/about-the-scac.html#about [https://perma.cc/W53M-7UCC]
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
215. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
216. Vanessa Wong, Halliburton v. Erica John P. Fund, Inc., Fraud-on-the-Market
Presumption of Reliance Established; What Now?, 43 RUTGERS. L. REC. 148, 154 n.45, 155
(2016) (noting that federal law preempts “most state-filed class actions involving nationally
traded securities”); Fast Answers: Class Actions, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www
.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersclasshtm.html [https://perma.cc/S7PN-UU5Q] (last visited
June 27, 2018).
217. Rules 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the requirements
for class certification. There are four threshold requirements for class certification, each of
which must be met: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of class members is impracticable
(numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality); (3)
the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical of those of the class (typicality);
and (4) the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class
(adequacy). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Courts have added additional requirements: (1) that a
definable class exists, (2) the named representatives are members of that class, and (3) the
claim of the class is live, rather than moot. Shriver Center, 7.2 Rule 23 Class Certification
Requirements, FED. PRAC. MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTY’S, http://www.federalpracticemanu
al.org/node/42 [https://perma.cc/8JQ3-DCKY] (last updated 2017).
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negative shock occurs in share prices, thus it is not likely that any large class-
action lawsuit would be excluded from this data set.218 After obtaining data
from the SCAC, we applied filters to account for frivolous cases. We
eliminated dismissed and ongoing cases, private company cases, and cases
with settlement amounts lower than $25 million. We set a minimum
settlement amount to ensure that damages are sufficiently large, enabling
insiders to predict a drop in share prices. We are left with 131 companies
after the filters.
We collected insider trading data from Thomson Reuters (TFN) from
1996 to 2017.219 Between 1975 and 1995, we have obtained insider trading
data from the National Archives. We combine these two datasets to create a
continuous record of insider trading covering the period from 1975 to 2017.
Our database consists of legally-mandated reporting of the universe of all
insider transactions; it contains the date, the volume and amount of purchases
and sales of insider trades, names and titles of insiders, the name and CUSIP
number of the firm, and other information.220 We use the information on
insider trading of top executives, independent directors, dependent directors,
and other officers as follows. Top executives, dependent directors, other
officers, and independent directors are classified using role codes in the TFN
database. Top executives are limited to officer and director (OD), officer,
director, and beneficial owner (H), chairman of the board (CB), CEO (CEO),
CFO (CFO), controlling person (CP), general partner (GP), and president
(P). Independent directors are coded with (D). Inside directors and other
officers are defined as all other officers. We include any large shareholder
with any officer title. We exclude outside large shareholders (SH) and
outside beneficial owners of more than 10% of a class security (B). These
outside groups are typically harmed by corporate fraud and thus they are not
likely to be aware of any ongoing corporate fraud.
Next, we combine the SCAC and insider trading information and we
are left with the trading activities of insiders from companies that were
involved in fraud settlements after enactment of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.221 We construct pre-class and post-class
218. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., 46 (2009); Paul A. Griffin et al., Stock Price Response to News of
Securities Fraud Litigation: Market Efficiency and the Slow Diffusion of Costly Information,
2 (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No 208, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=251766 [https://perma.cc/JN55-L6Y3].
219. THOMSON REUTERS, WHARTON RESEARCH DATA SERVICES, http://www.whartonwrd
s.com/datasets/thomson-reuters-2/ [https://perma.cc/CH7Q-9ZSD] (last visited June 27,
2018).
220. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A § 78p (West 2010).
221. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
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periods as control periods. The pre-class, class, and post-class periods have
the same number of days. For example, if class period is 100 days, so are
the pre-class and post-class periods. The pre-class period starts from 100
days before the class period begins and ends the day before the class action
starts. Similarly, the post-class period starts the day after the class period
ends and lasts 100 days. We test the timing of insider trading activities for
the pre-class period before the class action starts, during the class action
period, and for the post-class period.
B. Methodology: Measuring Insiders’ Abnormal Stock Profits
We use a standard event study model to measure abnormal returns of
insiders around trade dates.222 The event date, day 0, is the insider trade day
for each transaction. We measure cumulative abnormal returns around event
days by using market-adjusted daily returns as follows:𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶$,& =(𝐻𝐻$,* (𝑟𝑟$,* − 𝑟𝑟/,*)&*12where Hi,t takes value 1 for insider purchases and -1 for insider sales. The
variable ri,t is the return to stock i on day t. rm,t is the market return, which is
with-dividend return to the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio of the NYSE,
American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ stocks for day t. An insider
purchase is profitable if the stock return outperforms market return, and an
insider sale is profitable if stock return is less than market return for day t.
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
222. There are many studies examining the profitability of insider trading. See, e.g., H.
Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON.
189, 210 (1986) (finding that insiders can predict abnormal rise in stock prices); Arturo Bris,
Do Insider Trading Laws Work? 23 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-19, 2010)
(demonstrating that regulators make insider-trading more profitable by prohibiting it); H.
Nejat Seyhun, The Information Content of Aggregate Insider Trading, 61 J. BUS. 1, 22 (1988)
(investigating the information content of aggregate insider trading); H. Nejat Seyhun, Why
Does Aggregate Insider Trading Predict Future Stock Returns?, 107 J. ECON. 1302, 1329
(1992) (demonstrating a strong relation between past aggregate insider trading and future
excess stock returns); Bin Ke et al., What Insiders Know About Future Earnings and How
They Use It: Evidence from Insider Trades,35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 315 (2003) (providing
evidence that insiders possess, and trade upon, knowledge of specific and economically
significant forthcoming accounting disclosures); John E. Core et al., Stock Market Anomalies:
What Can We Learn from Repurchases and Insider Trading? 25 (2005), http://papers.ssrn.co
m/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=533323 [https://perma.cc/GRT6-3UD3] (finding managers’
trading decisions to be correlated with strategies suggested by operating accruals); Albert S.
Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315, 1315 (1985)
(arguing that insider makes positive profits by exploiting monopoly power in a dynamic
context); H. Nejat Seyhun & Michael Bradley, Corporate Bankruptcy and Insider Trading,
70 J. BUS. 189, 203, 214 (1997) (finding that corporate insiders engage in significant sales
prior to filing a bankruptcy petition).
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Next, we cumulate all abnormal returns for 10, 20, 50, 100, 150, 200, and
250 days after the event to compute abnormal profits gained from insider
trades.
C. Overall Comparisons
Table 1 displays the sample characteristics of insider trading in all
public firms between 1996 and 2017. This table provides information about
trades of officers and directors, top executives, and independent directors.
Purchases and sales are reported separately. We also classify companies into
three categories. Small-cap firms are firms with less than $1 billion market
capitalization. Midcap firms are defined by market capitalization between
$1 billion and $5 billion. Large cap firms have higher than $5 billion in
market capitalization.
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Table 1
Sample Characteristics of Insider Trading in All Firms (1975 to 2017)
Small- Cap
Firms Mid-Cap Firms Large-Cap Firms
All Purchase
Firms
Market
Capitalization
is less than $1
Billion
Market
Capitalization
is between $1
Billion and $5
Billion
Market
Capitalization is
more than $5
Billion
Purchases
Number of Firms 17,361 1,915 588 21,332
Number of Trades 807,206 95,066 35,354 894,623
Average Trade Size (Shares) 13,217 14,811 38,553 12,722.64
Total Shares Traded by
Officers and Directors
(Million) 2,651 521 964 4,136
Total Shares Traded by Top
Executives(Million) 2,891 409 163 3,463
Total Shares Traded by
Independent Directors
(Million) 5,127 478 236 5,841
Total Shares Traded (Million) 10,669 1,408 1,363 13,340
Small- Cap
Firms Mid-Cap Firms Large-Cap Firms
All Sale
Firms
Market
Capitalization
is less than $1
Billion
Market
Capitalization
is between $1
Billion and $5
Billion
Market
Capitalization is
more than $5
Billion
Sales
Number of Firms 16,443 1,954 617 19,014
Number of Trades 1,432,961 864,635 596,265 2,893,861
Average Trade Size (Shares) 11,601 10,655 31,566 14,378
Total Shares Traded by
Officers and Directors
(Million) 7,049 5,022 4,142 16,213
Total Shares Traded by Top
Executives(Million) 5,712 3,352 4,002 13,066
Total Shares Traded by
Independent Directors
(Million) 5,300 3,786 3,243 12,329
Total Shares Traded (Million) 18,061 12,160 11,387 41,608
The table shows that both the number of firms involved in insider
trading and the number of trades is decreasing with market capitalization,
while the average trade size is increasing with market capitalization. The
number of sales is more frequent than the number of purchases. Insider sales
to purchase ratio numbers are slightly more than 3-1. The ratio of purchases
to sales is highest for large-cap firms (17-1); lower for mid-cap firm (9-1)
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and lowest for small firms (1.7-1) and it follows similar patterns for officers,
directors, top executives, and independent directors. This pattern shows that
independent directors behave like other insider traders.
Next, we compare the overall profitability for independent directors and
other insiders.223 Table 2 shows insiders’ abnormal profits computed in all
publicly listed firms between 1975 and 2017. Our evidence shows that all
officers, top executives and independent directors trade profitably.
Following these transactions, all officers earn about 4.0% in abnormal
returns, top executives earn around 4.9% and independent directors earn
around 4.1%. Overall, our evidence indicates that for the 43-year period
from 1975 to 2017, independent directors trade in a similar fashion and earn
comparable profits as other insiders. There is no evidence of any
“independent” behavior by independent directors.
223. There is a growing literature that ties the profitability of insider trading to corporate
governance. See generally Taylan Mavruk & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do SEC’s 10b5-1 Safe Harbor
Rules Need to be Rewritten, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 153 (2016) (finding that, on average,
insider trading under safe harbor plans appears to be motivated by non-public information);
Cindy A. Schipani and H. Nejat Seyhun, Defining “Material, Nonpublic”: What Should
Constitute Illegal Insider Information?, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FİN. L. 327 (2016) (arguing
that the ambiguity of what constitutes illegal insider information enables corporate insiders);
S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Ending Executive Manipulations of
Incentive Compensation, 42 J. CORP. L. 277 (2016) (showing that as a result of manipulative
devices executives can increase compensation by about 6%); S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A.
Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Manipulative Games of Gifts by Corporate Executives, 18 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 1131 (2016) (finding executives use legal loopholes to maximize the value of
their tax deductions for gifts of stock); Hollis A. Skaife et al., Internal Control over Financial
Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from the Profitability of Insider
Trading, 55 J. ACCT. & ECON. 91, 107 (2013) (examining the association between ineffective
internal control over financial reporting and the profitability of insider trading); Enrichetta
Ravina & Paola Sapienza, What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their
Trading, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 962, 1001 (2010) (demonstrating that executives and independent
directors make higher returns in firms with the weakest governance); Anup Agrawal & Sahiba
Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 68 J L. & ECON. 371, 403 (2005)
(assessing whether certain corporate governance mechanisms are related to the probability of
a company restating its earnings); Scott L. Summers & John T. Sweeney, Fraudulently
Misstated Financial Statements and Insider Trading: An Empirical Analysis, 73 ACCT. REV.
131, 144 (1998) (finding that insiders reduce their holdings of company stock in the presence
of fraud).
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Table 2
Insiders' Abnormal Profits in all Publicly Listed Firms between 1975 and 2017.
Number of
Observations
10-
days
20-
days
50-
days
100-
days
150-
days
200-
days
250-
days
Officers
(except
Independent
Directors)
1,423,271 0.44% 0.69% 1.50% 2.37% 2.86% 3.35% 4.04%
(4.41) (4.91) (6.71) (7.49) (7.35) (7.46) (8.04)
Top
Executives 1,316,440 0.70% 1.00% 1.80% 2.88% 3.62% 4.20% 4.92%
(6.78) (6.86) (7.77) (8.79) (9.00) (8.99) (9.43)
Independent
Directors 1,091,776 0.65% 0.90% 1.57% 2.34% 2.83% 3.26% 4.11%
(6.82) (6.64) (7.30) (7.65) (7.51) (7.49) (8.44)
*Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better.
D. Class-Action Subsample Comparisons
Table 3 displays the sample characteristics of insiders in firms that
settled securities fraud class actions during the same period (1996 through
2017). Once again, insider sales are more than insider purchases. Insider
sales to purchase ratios now number more than 10-1. Thus, firms involved
in class action lawsuits are three times more likely to experience insider
selling than the overall sample. The number of firms and the number of
trades are higher for firms with higher market capitalization, indicating
higher insider trading activity in large SCA-settled firms. The average class
period is around 612 calendar days. The class period generally increases
along with market capitalization.
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Table 3
Sample Characteristics of Insider Trading in Firms with Securities Fraud Settlements (1996 to 2017)
Small- Cap Firms Mid-Cap Firms Large-Cap Firms
All Purchase
Firms
Market
Capitalization is
less than $1 Billion
Market Capitalization
is between $1 Billion
and $5 Billion
Market
Capitalization is
more than $5
Billion
Purchases
Number of Firms 19 43 53 115
Length of Class Period
(Days) 501 686 591 611
Average Settlement
($Mill.) 65.9 107.1 253.0 167.5
Number of Insider Trades 927 992 1074 2,993
Average Trade Size
(Shares) 17,522 25,509 46,875 34,036
Total Shares Traded by
Officers (Million) 10.2 9.5 19.0 38.7
Total Shares Traded by
Top Executives (Million) 4.5 8.6 12.1 25.2
Total Shares Traded by
Independent Directors
(Million)
1.6 7.2 19.3 28.1
Total Shares Traded
(Million) 16.3 25.3 50.4 92.0
Sales
Mid-Cap Firms Large-Cap Firms All Sale Firms
Small- Cap
Firms
Market
Capitalization is
less than $1 Billion
Market Capitalization
is between $1 Billion
and $5 Billion
Market
Capitalization is
more than $5
Billion
Number of Firms 33 45 54 132
Length of Class Period
(Days) 431 654 583 569
Average Settlement
($Mill.) 179.7 115.3 275.0 196.7
Number of Insider Trades 2,313 14,014 15,393 31,720
Average Trade Size
(Shares) 11,601 10,654.6 31,565.9 19,445.8
Total Shares Traded by
Officers (Million) 8.6 65.0 132.0 205.6
Total Shares Traded by
Top Executives (Million) 9.7 53.0 228.7 291.4
Total Shares Traded by
Independent Directors
(Million)
8.4 31.3 125.2 164.9
Total Shares Traded
(Million) 26.7 149.3 485.9 661.9
The average settlement amount is increasing monotonically with
market capitalization. The average settlement amount is around $60-$90
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million for small-cap stocks. This amount grows to about $250-275 million
for large-cap stocks. This finding indicates that larger firms with deeper
pockets tend to settle for larger amounts.
Next, we turn our attention to profitability of insider trading in SCA-
settled firms. Table 4 displays insiders’ abnormal profits in firms subject to
securities fraud lawsuits between 1996 and 2017 and settled for at least $25
million. We examine insider trading separately before the class period,
during the class period, and after the class period. The first column shows
the number of observations in each column. The number of insider trades
by officers and top executives are comparable, while independent directors
have engaged in about half as many insider trading transactions as officers
or top executives.
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Table 4
Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding
$25 Million between 1996 and 2017
Number of
Observations
10-
days 20-days
50-
days
100-
days
150-
days
200-
days
250-
days
Officers-
Before Class
Period
4,656 0.91% 0.45% 0.04% -1.73% -1.62% -3.48% -1.94%
(1.16) (0.40) (0.02) (-0.70) (-0.53) (-0.99) (-0.50)
Officers-
During Class
Period
6,747 1.28% 2.19% 5.43% 11.12% 20.58% 28.09% 35.05%
(1.63) (1.98) (3.10) (4.49) (6.78) (8.02) (8.95)
Officers-
After Class
Period
1,424 1.16% 1.35% 2.71% 11.45% 16.48% 23.58% 31.26%
(1.66) (1.37) (1.75) (5.20) (6.11) (7.57) (8.97)
Top
Executives-
Before Class
Period
3,464 -0.01% -0.97%
-
0.15% 0.76% 3.77% 0.32% 4.94%
(-0.01) (-0.83) (-0.08) (0.29) (1.18) (0.09) (1.20)
Top
Executives-
During Class
Period
6,485 2.00% 4.41% 7.50% 10.37% 17.64% 21.86% 23.14%
(1.92) (3.00) (3.23) (3.15) (4.38) (4.71) (4.45)
Top
Executives-
After Class
Period
2,295 2.63% 1.87% 4.74% 16.04% 23.59% 32.66% 43.77%
(5.44) (2.74) (4.42) (10.48) (12.62) (15.13) (18.08)
Independent
Directors -
Before Class
Period
1,903 -0.03% -0.12%
-
0.22% -2.15% -2.04% -0.86% -0.96%
(-0.05) (-0.15) (-0.18) (-1.24) (-0.96) (-0.35) (-0.35)
Independent
Directors -
During Class
Period
3,700 1.09% 1.11% 2.19% 3.17% 5.01% 14.45% 16.42%
(0.99) (0.71) (0.89) (0.92) (1.18) (2.95) (3.00)
Independent
Directors -
After Class
Period
1,670 2.54% 2.93% 1.59% 1.64% 8.54% 9.59% 5.31%
(2.58) (2.10) (0.72) (0.52) (2.23) (2.17) (1.07)
*Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better.
The number of insider trades is greater during the class period as
compared to pre- and post-class periods even though the length of the periods
is the same. This indicates that the class period involves more information
asymmetry and thus more profitability from insider trading than pre- and
post-class periods. This fact is valid for all insider groups; however, it is
more pronounced for top executives and independent directors.
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The first three lines of Table 4 show the abnormal returns of insider
trading to officers (except independent directors) in pre-class, class, and
post-class periods. Pre-class period abnormal returns are statistically not
different from 0 for 4,656 observations. The number of insider trading
transactions increase to 6,747 in the class period. The abnormal returns of
all officers reach up to 35% during the 250 days after insider trading
transaction. Moreover, abnormal profitability for 20 to 250 days is
statistically significant for this insider trading group. This finding shows that
officers use material nonpublic information to make profits in the class
period. There are 1,424 insider trading transactions in the post-class period,
which do not show profitability for the first 50 days after insider trading. We
observe significant profits after 100-, 150-, 200- and 250-day event periods.
The profitability reaches up to 31% for the 250-day period.
The profitability of top executives is shown in the next three lines.
There is no significant profitability in the pre-class period for 3,464
observations. The number of transactions of top executives increase to 6,485
during the class period. Abnormal profitability of top executives rises up to
23% after 250 days of insider trading. Further, top executives’ transactions
display statistically significant abnormal returns immediately after the
insider trading day. This finding indicates that top executives do not refrain
from trading based on material non-public information. During the post-
class period, top executives engage in 2,295 insider trading transactions.
Profitability of insider trading to top executives continue in the post-event
period and reaches up to 44% 250 days after insider trading. Once again, top
executives’ transactions display profitability immediately after the insider
trading day.
Finally, we can see the trades of independent directors in the last three
rows. There are 1,903 pre-class period insider trading transactions and their
abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero. Hence,
independent directors do not profit in the pre-class period. The number of
transactions increase up to 3,700 in the class period. Abnormal returns to
independent directors reach up to 16% in the 250-day event period.
However, independent directors do not attain any significant profitability
until about 200 days after the insider trading day. This evidence indicates
that independent directors trade intensely based on material non-public
information. Independent directors conduct 1,670 transactions in the post-
class period. Profitability is fluctuating, yet always positive in this period.
Profitability after 200 days is about 9% and, after 250 days, it is about 5%.
Moreover, the independent directors’ profits display statistically significant
results immediately after the insider trading days. This evidence shows that
abnormal profits continue with breaks even after the class period.
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Next, we analyze whether the adoption of SOX impacted the trading
behavior of the insiders of SCA-settled firms. Table 5A shows abnormal
returns from insider trading before enactment of SOX. Hence the analysis
period is January 1996 to September 2002 for this table. The number of
transactions among insider groups varies from 173 to 1,817. For all three
groups, insiders always display profitable trading during the class period.
All officers earn 33%, top executives earn 48%, while the independent
directors earn 23%. All officers and top executives continue to trade during
the post class periods, while independent directors’ transactions during the
post class period do not attain statistical significance. This evidence
confirms that once again all three groups behave similarly, and earn
abnormal trading profits apparently from using the inside information
regarding the class action lawsuits.
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*Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better.
Next, we test whether the enactment of SOX made any difference in the
behavior of independent directors. Table 5B displays the abnormal returns
in the post-SOX period, between September 2002 and December 2017. First,
we notice that all three groups of insiders trade the greatest number of
transactions during the class period. For all three groups, the number of
Table 5A
Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding
$25 Million between 1996 and 2002 (Pre-SOX)
Number of
Observations
10-
days 20-days 50-days
100-
days
150-
days
200-
days
250-
days
Officers-
Before Class
Period
1,817 0.57% -1.44% 0.37% 1.82% 4.28% 4.05% 6.60%
(0.68) (-1.21) (0.20) (0.68) (1.31) (1.07) (1.56)
Officers-
During Class
Period
1,535 2.68% 5.78% 9.37% 14.21% 21.10% 26.55% 33.00%
(4.40) (6.74) (6.86) (7.34) (8.90) (9.69) (10.78)
Officers-
After Class
Period
173 8.04% 12.14% 12.71% 16.37% 17.35% 21.72% 28.83%
(4.65) (4.96) (3.26) (2.96) (2.56) (2.78) (3.30)
Top
Executives-
Before Class
Period
1,219 -0.75% -2.42% 1.46% 7.17% 19.38% 18.42% 23.46%
(-0.63) (-1.46) (0.55) (1.92) (4.25) (3.49) (3.98)
Top
Executives-
During Class
Period
943 3.73% 6.75% 9.93% 14.86% 28.58% 35.56% 47.91%
(4.14) (5.32) (4.92) (5.22) (8.18) (8.83) (10.63)
Top
Executives-
After Class
Period
524 2.11% 1.05% -0.81% 7.39% 23.03% 29.84% 38.05%
(1.37) (0.49) (-0.24) (1.53) (3.88) (4.35) (4.97)
Independent
Directors-
Before Class
Period
887 -0.20% -0.43% -1.67% -4.15% -4.94% -4.44% -3.14%
(-0.23) (-0.36) (-0.88) (-1.54) (-1.49) (-1.16) (-0.73)
Independent
Directors-
During Class
Period
468 2.56% 4.40% 7.43% 6.63% 13.99% 14.73% 22.84%
(2.86) (3.48) (3.71) (2.34) (4.03) (3.68) (5.09)
Independent
Directors-
After Class
Period
120 -0.53% -1.10% -9.86% -15.75% -7.71% 0.12% 3.96%
(-0.22) (-0.33) (-1.88) (-2.13) (-0.85) (0.01) (0.34)
276 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 21:2
transactions during the class period, doubles or trebles compared to pre- and
post-class periods. This evidence indicates that, if anything, all three groups
of insiders have apparently become more aggressive in exploiting their
securities-lawsuit related information during the class period than after the
enactment of SOX.
*Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better.
Table 5B
Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements
Exceeding $25 Million between 2002 and 2017 (Post-SOX)
Number of
Observations
10-
days
20-
days
50-
days
100-
days
150-
days
200-
days
250-
days
Officers-
Before Class
Period
2,839 1.12% 1.66% -0.17% -4.01% -5.40% -8.29% -7.41%
(0.97) (1.02) (-0.07) (-1.10) (-1.21) (-1.61) (-1.29)
Officers-
During Class
Period
5,212 0.86% 1.14% 4.27% 10.21% 20.43% 28.55% 35.66%
(0.86) (0.81) (1.92) (3.24) (5.29) (6.40) (7.16)
Officers-
After Class
Period
1,251 0.21% -0.14% 1.33% 10.77% 16.35% 23.83% 31.59%
(0.27) (-0.13) (0.79) (4.47) (5.54) (6.99) (8.28)
Top
Executives-
Before Class
Period
2,245 0.39% -0.18% -1.02% -2.72% -4.70% -9.51% -5.11%
(0.36) (-0.12) (-0.42) (-0.80) (-1.12) (-1.98) (-0.95)
Top
Executives-
During Class
Period
5,542 1.70% 4.01% 7.08% 9.61% 15.78% 19.54% 18.97%
(1.42) (2.37) (2.64) (2.54) (3.40) (3.65) (3.16)
Top
Executives-
After Class
Period
1,771 2.79% 2.11% 6.37% 18.58% 23.76% 33.49% 45.46%
(3.75) (2.00) (3.83) (7.89) (8.26) (10.09) (12.22)
Independent
Directors-
Before Class
Period
1,016 0.12% 0.16% 1.05% -0.41% 0.49% 2.27% 0.94%
(0.17) (0.16) (0.67) (-0.19) (0.18) (0.73) (0.27)
Independent
Directors-
During Class
Period
3,232 0.88% 0.63% 1.42% 2.67% 3.71% 14.40% 15.49%
(0.70) (0.35) (0.51) (0.68) (0.77) (2.58) (2.48)
Independent
Directors-
After Class
Period
1,550 2.78% 3.24% 2.47% 2.99% 9.80% 10.32% 5.42%
(2.67) (2.20) (1.06) (0.90) (2.43) (2.22) (1.04)
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Table 5B shows that abnormal profitability of insider trading continues
at high levels even after the passage of SOX. All officers earn 36%, top
executives earn 19%, while independent directors earn 15% from insider
trading during the class period after the passage of SOX. Once again, both
the abnormal profitability of trading as well as the number of transactions by
independent directors follow very similar patterns as those for all officers
and top executives. Independent directors behave similarly to all other top
management groups both before and after the passage of SOX. This
evidence is consistent with the conclusion that independent directors’
interests continue to appear to be aligned with other members of top
management and not with shareholders.
Although not shown, we also explore insiders’ purchase and sales
transactions separately. Our evidence indicates that the overwhelming
majority of insider trading in class-action involved firms come from sales,
and not purchases. Furthermore, abnormal profits from insiders’ purchase
transactions never attain positive statistical significance for firms involved
in class action lawsuits. Instead, all abnormal profitability is restricted to
insiders’ sales only. Thus, our evidence indicates that insiders exclusively
exploit their negative information regarding the potential lawsuits, sell their
own firms’ stock and earn abnormal profits from these sales. Earning
abnormal profits from their sales transactions represents a further conflict of
interest between shareholders and top management.
As a sensitivity test, we analyze the profitability of insider trading
where companies settled for smaller amounts. Table 6 presents the abnormal
profitability of insider trading for company settlements between three
million and twenty-five million dollars. The evidence shows that
profitability continues even when companies settle for smaller amounts.
Abnormal profitability of insiders with smaller company settlements in the
class period is 36%, 19%, and 15% for all officers, top executives, and
independent directors, respectively. Comparing abnormal returns of insiders
from companies with larger settlements, we observe that profitability of
insider trading is somewhat higher when the SCA is settled for a smaller
amount. One possible explanation for these results is that insiders may be
viewing the costs of profitable trading to be less in smaller settlement cases.
Consequently, all three groups of insiders are taking more aggressive trading
positions to exploit their asymmetric information advantage.
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Table 6
Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Between $3
Million and $25 Million between 1996 and 2017.
Number of
Observations
10-
days 20-days
50-
days
100-
days
150-
days
200-
days
250-
days
All
Officers-
Before
Class
Period
2,839 1.12% 1.66% -0.17% -4.01% -5.40% -8.29% -7.41%
(0.97) (1.02) (-0.07) (-1.10) (-1.21) (-1.61) (-1.29)
All
Officers-
During
Class
Period
5,212 0.86% 1.14% 4.27% 10.21% 20.43% 28.55% 35.66%
(0.86) (0.81) (1.92) (3.24) (5.29) (6.40) (7.16)
All
Officers-
After Class
Period
1,251 0.21% -0.14% 1.33% 10.77% 16.35% 23.83% 31.59%
(0.27) (-0.13) (0.79) (4.47) (5.54) (6.99) (8.28)
Top
Executives-
Before
Class
Period
2,245 0.39% -0.18% -1.02% -2.72% -4.70% -9.51% -5.11%
(0.36) (-0.12) (-0.42) (-0.80) (-1.12) (-1.98) (-0.95)
Top
Executives-
During
Class
Period
5,542 1.70% 4.01% 7.08% 9.61% 15.78% 19.54% 18.97%
(1.42) (2.37) (2.64) (2.54) (3.40) (3.65) (3.16)
Top
Executives-
After Class
Period
1,771 2.79% 2.11% 6.37% 18.58% 23.76% 33.49% 45.46%
(3.75) (2.00) (3.83) (7.89) (8.26) (10.09) (12.22)
Independent
Directors-
Before
Class
1,016 0.12% 0.16% 1.05% -0.41% 0.49% 2.27% 0.94%
(0.17) (0.16) (0.67) (-0.19) (0.18) (0.73) (0.27)
Independent
Directors-
During
Class
3,232 0.88% 0.63% 1.42% 2.67% 3.71% 14.40% 15.49%
(0.70) (0.35) (0.51) (0.68) (0.77) (2.58) (2.48)
Independent
Directors-
After Class
1,550 2.78% 3.24% 2.47% 2.99% 9.80% 10.32% 5.42%
(2.67) (2.20) (1.06) (0.90) (2.43) (2.22) (1.04)
(0.27) (-0.13) (0.79) (4.47) (5.54) (6.99) (8.28)
*Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPROVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The presence of independent directors on the board has advantages and
disadvantages. Some commentators argue that insiders also play a vital role,
even considering their lack of independence, because they act as a source of
important firm-specific information for the board.224 Insiders also have the
information, knowledge, and resources that may allow them to more
accurately monitor their fellow insiders.225 On the other hand, dependent
members are directly involved with daily operational management and
related decision-making, and therefore may lack objectivity or worse. The
following part discusses various critiques of the role of independent boards,
including the infrequency of judicial findings of liability for failure of
oversight, with implications for improving corporate governance.
A. Critiques of Independent Boards
Heavy reliance by independent board members on the insider’s
financial analysis is a weakness of the current monitoring model, making
supervision more problematic. For example, independent members are less
informed than insiders about the firm’s constraints and opportunities.226
Whether American boards need more independent members remains
unclear.
The CEO’s informal influence over board appointments provides
another challenge for board independence. Agency theory posits that as long
as the CEO is the leader of the board, his or her influence remains high.227
On the other hand, management theory advocates for a single strong leader
of the company to assure unity of command at the top.228 Regulatory efforts,
such as mandating independent nominating committees, majority voting, and
certain changes of proxy access, may reduce the tension between board
members and the CEO. As mentioned above, both the NYSE and NASDAQ
require firms either to appoint a nominating committee, or employ a process
under which nominations are made by independent members of the board.229
There is evidence that the number of outsiders on the board increases
224. Linck, et al., supra note 73, at 310.
225. Fairfax, supra note 7, at 132.
226. Linck, et al., supra note 73, at 310.
227. See Sydney Finkelstein & Richard A. D’Aveni, CEO Duality as a Double-Edged
Sword: How Boards of Directors Balance Entrenchment Avoidance and Unity of Command,
37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1079, 1081-83 (1994) (discussing the agency theory’s concern of
management dominating the board).
228. Id. at 1083.
229. NYSE, Listed Company Manual § 303A.00 (2018).
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as the CEO’s influence increases over top management.230 Independent
members of the board are also encouraged to meet without managerial
members in order to keep managerial influence at minimum.231
Lucian A. Bebchuk contends that to enhance monitoring of the CEO, it
is important to decrease the degree to which the CEO informally influences
independent director appointments, and to “make these directors accountable
to public investors.”232 Furthermore, in the controlled firms, there is a
slightly different set of issues.233 Bebchuk further argues that the manner of
electing board members decreases the effectiveness of independent director
oversight234—because controllers have a strong influence on selection of
board candidates, independent members have weighty incentives to support
the controller, undermining their strength in conflicted decisions.235
The assumption that independent outside directors will monitor the
actions of management to minimize agency costs and maximize shareholder
value may find its roots in public perception rather than facts.236 The
underlying logic behind that notion presupposes that because independent
members are less committed to company operations and management, they
are not subject to agency problems, and are thus expected to monitor
dependent members.237 On the other hand, as practice demonstrates, they
can be passive and ineffective when they lack enough information about
company activities238 and further, they may hinder efficient operations.239
B. Liability of Independent Directors for Failure of Oversight
Independent directors are rarely found liable for violation of their
oversight duties in either civil or criminal contexts.240 And even if
230. Linck, et al., supra note 73, at 312.
231. Gordon, supra note 14, at 1497.
232. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling
Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1276-77 (2017).
233. NYSE defines a controlled company as a company of which more than fifty percent
of the voting power for the election of its directors is held by a single person, group or another
entity. NYSE, Listed Company Manual § 303A.04(a) (2013).
234. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 232, at 1274.
235. Id.
236. Steven T. Petra, Do Outside Independent Directors Strengthen Corporate Boards?,
5 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. BUS. SOC’Y 55, 62 (2005).
237. Adams & Ferreira, supra note 21, at 221-22.
238. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1541 (noting that in one area “[as] [t]he independents’
information debilities decrease . . . their monitoring advantages become more apparent”).
239. Id.
240. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 167-71 (discussing the lack of independent director
liability in various contexts).
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independent board members are charged with a violation, because of
insurance, indemnification, and statutory protections, their liability rarely
leads to out-of-pocket damages.241 Given the infrequency of the independent
director’s liability, effectiveness of their monitoring activities is
questionable. Some authors point out, however, that the threat of increased
liability may discourage people from directorships, leading to a lack of well-
qualified independent candidates in future.242 But because government
regulators shift significant policing function to the hands of independent
directors, their least accountable status in corporate law is concerning.
Potentially, director liability for a breach of the duty to exercise
appropriate attention may, in theory, arise in two distinct contexts.243 As the
court in one case explained:
First, such liability may be said to follow from a board decision
that results in a loss because that decision was ill advised or
“negligent.” Second, liability to the corporation for a loss may be
said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the board to act in
circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have
prevented the loss.244
But the BJR applies to the first group of cases, effectively eviscerating
the risk of liability if the decision made was from a process that was
deliberately considered in good faith or rational.245 The “business judgment
rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for all good faith
board decisions.”246
Thus, where a director exercises a good faith effort, in fact, to be both
informed and enable them to exercise appropriate judgment, the duty of care
is satisfied.247 If shareholders are not satisfied with the judgment, as the court
in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation noted, they
“should have elected other directors.”248 Thus, the “core element” of any
corporate law duty of care inquiry is whether a good faith effort was made
to be informed and exercise appropriate judgment.249
The Caremark court went on to note that the “second class of cases in
which director liability for inattention is theoretically possible entail
241. Id. at 168.
242. Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 458 (2008).
243. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 967-68.
247. Id. at 968.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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circumstances in which a loss eventuates not from a decision but, from
unconsidered inaction.”250 In this case, the court held that without some
reason to suspect deceit, corporate boards and senior officers cannot be
charged with any wrongdoings only because they incorrectly assumed
employees were acting with honesty and integrity on the company’s
behalf.251 Yet, the board must “exercise a good faith judgment that the
corporation’s information and reporting system is in concept and design
adequate to assure the board that appropriate information will come to its
attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations, so that it may
satisfy its responsibility.”252
In Stone v. Ritter,253 the court noted that the phrase in case law, which
describes an absence of good faith as a “necessary condition to liability,”254
is intentional.255 The court concluded, that the necessary conditions for
director oversight liability include the following: “(a) the directors utterly
failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b)
having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor
or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of
risks or problems requiring their attention.”256 For both tests, imposing
liability requires a showing that directors knew that they were failing to meet
their fiduciary duties.257 If directors do not act when they know they have a
duty to do so, they fail to discharge their fiduciary obligations in good faith
and thus breach their duty of loyalty.258
In Horman v. Abney,259 also known as the UPS case, shareholders
brought a derivative action against board members of UPS, alleging the UPS
board members breached their duty of loyalty by knowing failure of
monitoring and managing UPS’s compliance with state and federal laws
concerning delivery and transportation of cigarettes. The shareholders
sought to recover losses borne by the company from a pending enforcement
action that arose out of this breach of duty.260 The court explained that the
Caremark liability standard for violating a duty to actively monitor corporate
250. Id.
251. Id. at 969.
252. Id.
253. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
254. Id. at 364 (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d 959).
255. Id. at 369.
256. Id. at 370.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. No. CV 12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017) (mem.).
260. Id.
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affairs is very much related to a director’s failure to act in good faith.261
Therefore, the court held that to state a claim under Caremark, the facts pled
by the plaintiff must give rise to, or at least allow, a reasonable inference that
a director acted in contradiction to his or her fiduciary duties, and knew he
or she was acting in contradiction to these duties.262
The UPS court further stated, however, that even if directors exercise
their oversight responsibilities in good faith, this does not mean that
employees will not commit crimes, or that employees will not cause the
corporation to sustain substantial financial liability.263 Accordingly,
Delaware courts routinely reject the argument that just because there was an
incident of illegal behavior, internal controls must have been insufficient,
and the board must have had knowledge of this.264 Rather, a plaintiff must
“plead with particularity” about how the illegal corporate conduct is related
to the board’s actions.265
Explaining the first Caremark prong, the court held that “the board
cannot be held liable for breaching its duty, under the first prong of
Caremark, unless it can be proven that its members ‘utterly failed to
implement any reporting or information systems or controls.’”266 It is not a
Caremark claim to show that a system that was implemented with care and
seemed to be working well just failed to detect some fraud that occurred.267
In this case, as the court stated, “at best, the complaint might support an
inference that employees charged with the responsibility to implement
UPS’s oversight systems failed to report issues to the board. That is not
enough to sustain a Caremark claim.”268
Thus, in Delaware, it appears that the only way liability could be
established for failure to monitor is if the plaintiff shows that the board knew
of corporate misconduct but consciously disregarded its duty to address this
misconduct, thereby acting in bad faith.269 In this context, “bad faith means
‘the directors were conscious of the fact that they were not doing their jobs,
261. Id. at *7 (quoting Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70
(Del. 2006)).
262. Id. (quoting In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *22
(Del. Ch. May 31, 2011)).
263. Id. (quoting Stone, 911 A.2d at 373).
264. Id. (quoting Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 939-40 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
265. Id. (quoting 38 La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 340 (Del. Ch.
2012), rev’d on other grounds, 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013)).
266. Id. at *9 (quoting Stone, 911 A.2d at 370).
267. Id. (quoting David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Acct. v. Armstrong, No. Civ.A. 1449-N.,
2006 WL 391931, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2006)).
268. Id. at *10.
269. Id. (quoting Reiter ex rel. Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016
WL 6081823, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016)).
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and that they ignored red flags indicating misconduct in defiance of their
duties.’”270 However, typically:
[T]he red flag analogy depicts events or reports that serve as
warning signs to the Board of corporate wrongdoing after a system
of reporting and compliance is in place. These red flags put the
board on notice that the system is not working properly. If the
members of the board become aware of the red flags and do
nothing in response, and thereby consciously disregard their
fiduciary duties, then they each individually are subject to liability
for a failure of oversight.271
Thus, under the second prong of Caremark, the question is whether the
board knew of red flags and then whether the board attempted to address
them.272 In In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., the court held
that:
There are significant differences between failing to oversee
employee fraudulent or criminal conduct and failing to recognize
the extent of a company’s business risk. Directors should, indeed
must under Delaware law, ensure that reasonable information and
reporting systems exist that would put them on notice of fraudulent
or criminal conduct within the company. Such oversight programs
allow directors to intervene and prevent frauds or other
wrongdoing that could expose the company to risk of loss as a
result of such conduct.273
More recently, the court in Reiter v. Fairbank, held that “imposing
Caremark-type duties on directors to monitor business risk is fundamentally
different from imposing on directors a duty to monitor fraud and illegal
activity.”274 The case here involved an allegation that the “directors breached
their fiduciary duty of loyalty and unjustly enrich themselves by consciously
disregarding their responsibility to oversee Capital One’s compliance with
the Bank Secrecy Act and other anti-money laundering laws
‘(BSA/AML’).”275 Allegedly, these directors ignored the red flags related to
these violations, and the plaintiff alleged certain inadequacies in provision
of the services which in turn, allegedly exposed the bank to liability for
270. Id. (quoting Armstrong, 2006 WL 391931 at *5).
271. Id. at *11 (citing South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1, 15 (Del. Ch. 2012)).
272. Id. at *14.
273. 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009).
274. 2016 WL 6081823, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016) (quoting In re Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *22 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12,
2011) (internal quotation omitted)).
275. Id. at *1.
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money-laundering activities.276
The court held, however, that directors, while acting in good faith,
cannot always prevent employees’ wrongdoings, and therefore, a plaintiff
asserting a Caremark claim must demonstrate “a sufficient connection
between the corporate trauma and the board.”277 To show the connection,
the board must have known about the evidence of corporate misconduct, and
yet consciously disregarded its duty to address that wrongdoing.278
According to the court, the directors did not violate their fiduciary duties
because the evidence involved at best yellow flags, and the plaintiff failed to
show that “defendants consciously allowed Capital One to violate the law so
as to sustain a finding they acted in bad faith.”279
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Currently, the reliance in corporate law on the role of independent
directors to serve as gatekeepers in their monitoring role over management,
is flawed. Our empirical study provides new evidence that not only may
independent directors be ill-equipped to engage in serious oversight of the
activities of management, they may also be easily co-opted when they have
the opportunity to personally participate in self-interested transactions to the
detriment of the shareholders. Our current study provides evidence that
independent directors are not likely immune from the temptation to profit
from insider trading and especially insider selling. Our prior research also
demonstrates that they were similarly likely to manipulate stock option
compensation when the opportunity arose.280 Our results are also consistent
with and reinforce the conclusions reached by M.P.Narayanan and H. Nejat
Seyhun and Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer, where they
found opportunistically timed stock option grants awarded to inside and
independent directors.281 And as described above in Part II, numerous other
empirical studies have been critical of the ability of independent directors to
effectively serve a monitoring function. Moreover, the current legal
276. Id.
277. Id. at *8 (quoting Pyott, 46 A.3d at 340).
278. Id.
279. Id. at *14.
280. See generally S. B. Avci, Cindy A. Schipani, & H. N. Seyhun, Do Independent
Directors Curb Financial Fraud? The Evidence and Proposals for Further Reform 93 IND.
L. J. 757 (2018).
281. M.P. Narayanan & H. N. Seyhun, The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option
Grant Dates to Increase Their Compensation?, 21 REV. FIN. STUD., 1907, 1909-10 (2008);
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein, & Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, 65 J.
OF FIN. 2363, 2363-66 (2010).
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doctrines providing deference to independent directors appear not to offer
much in the way of a check on their behavior. Finally, even the definition of
an independent director appears ineffective for avoiding conflicts of interest
which arise from personal and social relationships.
Thus, independent status is not a sufficient condition for proper
monitoring. Informed oversight of management may also depend on other
characteristics necessary for the performance of director’s functions, such as
experience in the firm’s industry. One should not lean toward the other
extreme, however, and mandate the experience as a prerequisite to the
directorship. As the drafters of the Principles correctly point out “some of
the best ideas, insights and contributions can come from directors whose
professional experiences are not directly related to the company’s
business.”282 But industry background may be particularly helpful in
curtailing corporate fraud, allowing independent members to catch certain
red flags or inconsistencies in the company’s performance that may not be
apparent to the industry outsider. The director’s experience may also deter
management from manipulating and misleading the boards.
In addition, the current disclosure model has a significant flaw—
companies do not explain their reasoning for the designation of a director as
independent nor disclose information they considered during their
deliberations.283 The current disclosure requirements by the SEC about
independence designations are incomplete as well.284 Because of this, Aaron
Nili calls for an enhanced disclosure system, mandating disclosure of the
entire set of information that the company relied on in making their judgment
about a director’s independence, thus allowing its shareholders and outsiders
to subsequently check their designations.285 As a 2015 survey of institutional
investors found, 62% of respondents read the director independence section
of the proxy statement before voting.286 In addition to imposing significant
personal liability upon a director for failing to disclose connections a court
282. Common Sense Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 180, at 1.
283. Nili, supra note 19, at 40.
284. Id. at 71. Nili provides the following reasons for the lacking system. “First,
companies are only required to disclose what they considered as potentially material
information. Second, companies can escape the need to provide detailed information by
adopting categorical standards to assist them in making determinations of independence and
then may make only a general disclosure if a director meets these standards. Third, currently
a company can report different information about the director in various locations in its filing–
making it harder for shareholders to easily review the information. Finally, . . . many
companies provide no information to shareholders, potentially violating the current disclosure
regime, but these practices are not enforced by the SEC.” Id.
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286. Id. at 46.
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later finds material, making publicly available all information related to the
determination of independence, may lead to a more scrutinized nomination
process, thereby providing for a more fully informed vote.287
An enhanced disclosure system may, however, create a certain chilling
effect on the willingness of future candidates to become directors on the
board. But if directors have something to hide, then as Nili argues, perhaps
the chilling effect would be a positive development.288
We also recommend a more nuanced definition of independence. A
director should be banned from serving as an independent director by the
stock exchanges and SEC if a director fails to reveal a relationship, later
found to be material by a court. The prospect of liability and reputational
risks should provide a director with incentives to offer complete disclosures,
particularly of one’s social and casual connections to the company and its
insiders. In addition, we agree with the eBay and Oracle contextual analyses
of independence.289 Even if a director passes a general test of independence,
independence must be determined, case by case, in the context of the events
litigated.
Finally, as proposed in our prior work,290 we continue to recommend
more power be given to the shareholders to act as corporate monitors. These
recommendations include eliminating shareholder multi-class voting
structures, making shareholder resolutions binding, eliminating plurality
voting for board membership and replacing this with majority voting and
requiring companies to set up secure websites to allow shareholders to
review corporate issues and vote their choices.291 Of course, we realize that
many shareholders do not care to participate in corporate governance. Yet,
there are institutional and activist shareholders who do care and the current
regime does not provide for a full opportunity for their voices to be heard
287. See Matthew Heller, Investors Want More Disclosure on Director Qualifications,
CFO (Mar. 18, 2015), http://ww2.cfo.com/governance/2015/03/investors-want-disclosure-dir
ector-qualifications/ [https://perma.cc/VDB9-C9HH] (discussing a survey of institutional
investors calling for more information on both candidates and incumbents).
288. Id. at 75.
289. See Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, Fiduciary Constraints: Correlating
Obligation with Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 736-38 (2007) (discussing the
contextual approach of the Delaware courts in the eBay and Oracle cases).
290. Avci et al., supra note 280, at 4.
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